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EXPORTS of U.S. farm commodities totaled $23
billion in 1976 and are expected to exceed that
amount this year. Exports in the past year accounted
for almost 25 percent of tile dollar value of all farm
commodity sales, and the 100 million acres of land
utilized in producing this volume of exports repre-
sented 30 percent of the total acreage harvested, Thus,
exports play a significant role in determining the na-
tion’s farm income.
Since 1970 farm exports have increased both in
dollar value and as a share of total farm commodity
sales, The 1975-76 marketing year was the seventh
successive year of record agricultural exports in
nominal terms. The $23 billion of farm products ex-
ported last year was almost four times file dollar value
of farm exports in 1969 and more than double the
value of 1972. The nominal value of farm exports rose
at a 21 percent annual rate during tile seven-year
period since 1969, while in real terms (at constant
prices) they rose at a 12 percent rate. The value of
such exports rose from 14 percent of farm commodity
sales in 1970 to 24 percent in 1976. Furthermore, in
1976 a smaller proportion of the exports was sold on
concessional terms (aided by Government subsidies).
Concessional sales abroad declined from two percent
of total farm commodity sales in 1972 to one percent
in 1976.
Farm exports as a percent of farm commodity sales
have moved in a U-shaped pattern since W’orJd War I
(see accompanying cllart). In the early 1~20ssuch
exports exceeded 20 percent of gross farm receipts.
By the late 1920s farm exports had declined to 17
percent of sales; they averaged 11 percent of sales
during the l930s, 10 percent in the 1940s, and 12
percent in the 1950s. In the l960s exports rose to 15
percent of sales and continued upward in the 1970s,
averaging 24 percent of sales in the three calendar




The downturn in farm exports in the 1920s can be
largely traced to substantial increases in artificial re-
strictions on world trade in general. The relatively
free trade era beginning in the mid-1800s — trade
without high tariffs, quotas, and other government
restrictions — was generally on the wane following
World War I. In the 1920s there was an observable
worldwide trend toward increased international trade
restrictions. Britain, a traditionally free trade na-
tion, levied the Key industries Duty in 1921 which
imposed a 33.33 percent ad valorern tariff rate on
many items. In addition, wartime duties were reim-
posed on a number of “luxuries” in 1925, after their
lapse in 1924. The United States enacted the Fordney-
McCumber Tariff in 1924 raising import duties on
numerous items. Still higher duties were levied by the
United States in 1930 with the passing of the 1-lawley-
Smoot Act. This Act authorized tariff rate increases
on more tllan 800 items during the early stages of the
great depression. Ofiler nations immediately retali-
ated by increasing their import duties.’ Within two
years general tariff increases were enacted in nine
nations which comprised the major world market for
U.S. farm products, including Canada, Cuba, Mexico,
France, Italy, Spain, India, Argentina, and Brazil.
As a consequence of these trade restrictions and a
worldwide depression, which began in 1929, world
trade both in nominal terms and relative to GNP
declined sharply. From 1929 to 1932, the dollar value
of world trade dropped 61 percent, and the value of
U.S. foreign trade fell 69 percent.2 Total U.S. exports
For a more conlprehensive discussion of the impact of the
Hawley—Sn oot Act, sse Allan H. Meltxcr, Monetary and
Other Explanations of the Start of tIle Crcat l)cprcssion,”
Journa/ of Monetary Economics- ( November 1976), pp.
459-461.
2Statistica/ Yearbook of the League of Nations. 1934-35.
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Form Exports As Percent of Farm Commodity Sales
declined from 4.9 percent to 2.7 percent of GNP dur-
ing the period. Farm commodity exports declined
from $1.8 billion to $0.75 billion during the three
fiscal years ending in 1932. Farm exports as a share of
total farm production, however, remained relatively
stable during the early depression years despite the
higher tariff rates. In 1930, the first full year of the
depression, farm exports amounted to 13 percent of
farm commodity sales, and at the trough of the de-
pression in 1933 such exports, while declining sharply
in nonminal value, still totaled about 13 percent of
sales.
Free International Trade Espoused - -
With a new Administration in 1933, the political
climate changed, and this nation began to espouse the
cause of free international trade. The Hull Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934, the first of
a series of legislative attempts to expand international
trade. Other tariff reduction acts and international
agreements further contributed to free trade practices.
Especially significant were tlle General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade in 1947 and the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 which authorized the President to negoti-
ate nnmerous tariff reductions.
While attempts were being made to expand inter-
national trade through tariff reductions, Congress en-
acted special legislation in a number ot instances
which was designed to expand farm exports through
the use of export subsidies. The expansion of farm
exports through the use of Government subsidies was
a major factor in the post World \Var II assistance to
Europe and Japan under the United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration, the Marshall Plan.
and other relief and recovery programs. A fixed por-
tion of the foreign economic aid funds in 1954 was
earmarked to buy surplus farm commodities from the
United States. Public Law 480, passed in 1954, was
specifically designed to provide a foreign outlet for
‘surplus” farm products. While these programs were
not restrictive within themselves, they tended to pro-
duce retaliatory restrictive actions by other Ilations.
- --But Restrictive Farm Programs Enacted
Despite the stated free trade objectives in the for-
eign trade legislation and international agreements of
the 1930s and the following decades, the major farm
programs enacted during this period tended to re-
strict farm product exports. In 1943 Professor
Theodore \V. Schultz. in a study of domestic farm
programs, pomted out that most of the agricultural
agencies established during the 1930s were designed
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market) prices for farm productsd The methods used
to attain this objective were supply and production
controls, price supports, commodity storage, and sur-
plus disposal programs.
Production Controls and Price Supports
In 1933, when tile New Deal came into being
direct legislative action was taken to increase farm
product prices to levels above those dictated by tile
free market. The Agricultural Adjustment Adminis-
tration was established to curtail production of most
major crops. A specific number of acres was allocated
to the key crops ~n each farm. Price supports were set
through Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) non-
recourse loans to farmers on stored commodities. The
loan and storage programs, financed at taxpayer ex-
pense, were designed to guarantee a specific price,
usually above the free market level, to farm pro-
cheers by restricting the flow of commodities to both
domestic and export markets. The surplus disposal
programs — Public Law 480, school lunches, food
stamps, and otller food disposal schemes — were all
designed to increase total demand for farm products
and thereby enhance prices. The Public Law 480
program, wilich subsidized exports of farm commodi-
ties to the less developed nations, may have increased
farm exports somewhat. 1-lowever, such programs
were disruptive of normal trade [lows, and gener-
mdlv have been regarded as “dumping” ‘vllen used by
otller nations to export products to the United States.
Production controls am~ciprice supports have been
a 1najor deterrent to the expansion of international
trade in farm products over most of the period since
tilt’ early 1930s. They reduced domestic farm out-
put and led to increased prices for farm products
to all users, both domestic and foreign. The average
price of U.S. farm products rose at the rate of 15 per-
cent per year from 1932, the last year prior to the
programs, to 1935. In comnparison, the average price
of industrial commodities rose at a 3.4 percent rate
during this period.
Following tile production controls and price sup-
ports, U.S. farm commodity exports declined both
relative to farm commodity’ sales-’dllcl as a share of
total U.S~-e~xp()rts. Farm exports, which accounted for
14 percent of farm commodity sales in 1932, dropped
to 11 percent of such sales in 1934 following the re-
strictions, amld continued downward to 8.5 percent in
1936 (see chart). Farm exports averaged 38 percent
3
Theodorc W. Schultz, Redirecting Farm Pohcy ( New York:
TIse Macnmillan Company, 1943), p. 6.
of total U.S. exports during the eight years prior to the
programs (1926-33). Farm exports declined to an
average of 29 percent of total exports from 1934 to
1940 and to 23 percent of total exports from the end
of World War II until 1971, despite the government
subsidies on a sizable portion of the farm commodities
exported.~
i’he artificially high fann product prices resulting
from the production controls and price supports
caused the rest of the world to increase the produc-
tion of farm products from the amounts that would
ilave otherwise been produced. The higher farm pro-
duct prices increased the returns to resources in
agriculture and caused increased resources to move
into the industry in the rest of the world. Conse-
quently, farm production outside the United States
was enhanced and U.S. farm exports reduced. In ad-
dition, increased resources moved into the production
of farm commodity substitutes both here and abroad
leading to a further reduction in world demand for
U.S. farm products.
Cotton
One prime example of the consequences of the
U.S. farm production controls and subsidies was the
sharp decline in the usage of domestic cotton. In
1930, prior to tile acreage controls and price supports,
tins nation supplied more than 50 percent of the
worlds cotton production. At the beginning of V7orld
War II. after seven years of the programs, cotton
production in the United States had declined to 40
percent of the world total, and the nation’s share con-
tinued do\vn to less than 20 percent of the world
total in 1970. In 1930 the United States exported 7.1
mnillion bales of cotton, or more than 50 percent of
total world cotton exports. By 1940 U.S. cotton exports
had decimned to 1.2 million hales or about 15 percent
of the world total. The volume of domestic cotton ex-
ports rose folloxving World War II, hut in 1970 U.S.
exports totaled only 3.7 million hales, or 22 percent of
the world total.
The cotton programs han a major impact on world
laud resource use as indicated by shifts in tile acreage
used for cotton production. i)uring the- 1930s cotton
harvested in tile United States declined 43 percent,
from 42 million to 24 million acres. In contrast, cotton
harvested in foreign countries rose 24 percent, from
43 million to 53 mniliiomm acres during the period. In tile
40 years fromn 1930 to 1970, during most of which pro-
-ftJ,5, Dcparfmoent of Agriculture. Agrieultu,-a/ Statistics, 1972,
p. 698,
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duction controls and price supports were in effect,
acres of cotton harvested in the United States fell 74
percent, whereas the acreage harvested in the rest of
the world rose 57 percent. Although part of the re-
duction in cotton acreage in the United States
reflected rising domestic yields and technological
developnlents in the synthetic fiber industry, a large
part of tile shift call be attributed to the restrictive
cotton programs.
While the impact of the cotton restrictions on the
use of synthetic fiber substitutes is difficult to assess.
the higher prices for cotton resulting from the re-
strictions were no doubt a factor contributing to the
sharp increase in synthetic fiber usage. At the begin-
mug of the controls in 1933, synthetic fiber substitutes
were virtually unknown. Following W~orldWar II
such fibers began to compete aggressivelywith cotton,
and by 1975 the poundage of such fibers used by
domestic mills was more than double that of cotton.
Wheat
Cotton is only one examnple of export markets being
undermined by domestic farm production restrictions
and price supports. The wheat acreage controls and
price supports had a similar impact. The Government
began to hold wheat off the market in mid-1929
through loans to farmers by the Federal Farm Board.
In 1933 domestic acreage controls and the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement further contributed to rising
wheat prices and a reduction in wheat exports. While
the downward adjustment in domestic \vheat acreage
was not as much as was planned during the early
years of the controls, because of the drought in 1933
and 1934, the controls did reduce production, and
wheat prices rose.5 The prices received by farmers
rose from an average of ~0.48per bushel during the
three years 1930-32 to $0.82 during the six years
1934-39. Exports declined from an average of 103
million bushels per year during 1930-32 to an average
of 56 million bushels per year during 1934-39.
The adjustmnents in resource use in some of the
major wheat importing nations -as a result of the
higher prices took a predictable route. The largest
wheat importer, the United Kingdom, increased its
wheat acreage by plowing up some grassland and
planting it to wheat. Italy expanded her acreage by
clearing and draining the Pontine Marshes. France
5
1n 193-4 Sherman Johnsdnl estimated that the wheat programs
had resulted in prices 10 to 15 cents per bushel lligllcr than
they otherwise would have been. See fl‘heat tinder the Agri-
cultural Ad9ustnicnt Act (The Brookim mis Institution, 1934
p. 90.
her North African pos-
thereby reducing both
and imports from the
In tile United Kingdom \vheat prices in 1933 had
declined to 67 percent of the 1930 level; they de-
chilled further in 1934 but rose sharply in tile next
three years and durimlg tile two years 1937-38 they
averaged 51 percent abo\-e the 1933 level. The cereal
portion of the food price index likewise rose sharply,
imlcreaslng by 42 percent from 1933 to the al-erage for
1937-38. In contrast to the sharp increase in cereal
prices, the meat-fish and other food sectors of the
consumer price index rose only 12 and 13 percent,
respectively. In response to these changing price re-
lationships British farsners found it profitable to pio\v
up grazing land on which meat was being produced
and seed it to \vheat. The acreage seeded to wheat
rose from 1.34 million in 1932 to 1.92 million in 1938,
an increase of 43 percent. Wheat production in the
nation rose 67 percent during the period, and imports
of wheat declined. Total wheat and flour imports by
the United Kingdom declined 12 percent from the
1931-33 average to the 1937-38 average.6
Exports of most otller major crops, illcludimlg feed
grains, tobaceo rice and peanuts have likewise been
affected by the farm programs. hut not to the same
extent as wheat and cotton.
The unfavorable impact of the farm price supports
and controls on exports was pointed out by Professor
Dale llatha\vay in 1963:
Suddenly ill the mid-l950’s the impact (51 our
domestic programs upon foreign trade in farm prod-
ucts caine home to roost with a vengeance. Exports dli
farm products fell precipitons~’~ ag~’avatin g the do—
mnestie stocks prohiem and threatening us with a
pcrnlaluent loss of foreign mnarkets as foreign supplies
expimdledl to fill tile gap.
7
Co-ntrois Relaxed and Exports Rose
In recent years Government controls on agriculture
have been relaxed, and greater reliance has been
placed on free market forces in the use of farm pro-
duction resources and the pricing of farm commodi-
ties. Since the enactment of the Agricultural Act of
1970, most of the domestic farm restrictions Ilave been
~E. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British ilutorical Statistics ( Cain—
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 99.
~1)ale E - Ilatlla’vay, “Evaluation of Agricultural Pi-ogramns in
‘lernus of Economic C’. rowlII, Fmn-eign Trade, and Political
Feasibility: A General Appraisal, Increasing tnth’rstanding
of Publie Ping rarrrs and Policy ( Gb icago: Fit run Foundan on,
1969). p. 73.
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redesigned to permit competitive pricing of most
crops including wheat, feed grains, the major oilseeds,
and cotton. Acreage controls for most crops were
largely removed in 1974 with the elimination of the
set-aside provisions for cotton, wheat, and feed grains.
This action freed about 60 million additional acres for
crop production. CCC loans on basic crops have been
continued, but the rates have generally been set be-
low world-price levels and subsidies on the production
of many farm commodities have been eliminated.
The decline in the impact of the Government price-
support programs on the price of farm commodities is
indicated by the reduced volume of CCC loans and
holdings. Tn 1965 the value of farm commodities
owned by the CCC totaled $4.1 billion and the cor-
poration had an additional $2.6 billion of loans out-
standing on farm commodities through price support
operations. By 1974 the value of commodities owned
by the CCC had declined to $188 million, and CCC
loans outstanding were down to $681 million. The
freeing of agriculture from excessive production re-
strictions and the return to the price mechanism as
the major instnlment in managing the farm economy
has no doubt been a major factor in the sharp increase
in farm exports in recent years.
Other Factors Contr-ibuted to Rising
Farm Exports
A rising volume of world trade in recent years has
contributed to the sharp increase in U.S. farm exports.
Since 1970 exports of the eight major commercial na-
tions listed in Table I have increased faster than their
Gross National Product (GNP), and in most cases
export growth has more than doubled the rate of
GNP growth. In contrast, from 1960 to 1964 exports
rose at about the same rate as CNP.
In addition to the relaxation of farm programs
which has contributed to rising world trade in recent
years, other factors affecting the rising volume of farm
exports include: a relatively peaceful international
situation, the move to more flexible exchange rates,
some further tariff reductions, the OPEC oil cartel,
and rising real incomes. For centuries the threat of
war and the alleged demands for national defense
have been used as arguments for greater self suffi-
ciency. The military strength of a nation is believed
by mnany people to he enhanced by self-sufficiency in
economic production, particularly food. Consequently,
during periods of major threats to world peace and
immediately after major international disturbances
the proponents of self sufficiency are likely to influ-
Table I
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ANt) EXPORT
GROWTH IN LARGE COMMERCIAL NATIONS
(Compounded Annucd notes S hang I
196064 197074
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Export 59 24.4
Frau CMI’ 101 l3J
Exports 13 4 29.2
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Exports 11 7 US
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Export 3.8 2/.9
Petted Slates 014? 9 9.2
Exports 5.4 25 9
rue Un cit Na e on hi ThmiS,m a r ugumm
lflhp 1 CM Xe II? is41tt a tioutal Monetar Pu it, ~ t Pr 6 C p 2
mid Di ion a Trade 50-6 p, 2.
ence national trading policy, especially in those na-
tions which import a large percent of their food
supply. These proponents of self sufficiency hold that
it is safer in an uncertain world to provide the basic
mlecessities at home even at higher costs.8
The move to more flexible exchange rates in 1971
probably contributed to the rise in total international
trade by the United States and, thereby, to an in-
crease in farm exports. During the late 1960s the
dollar was overvalued in international trade — that is,
at the fixed exchange rate American produced goods
were less attractive in the international market than
foreign produced goods. Consequently, foreign pur-
chases of goods and services from the United States
declined relative to foreign sales to the United States.
However, with the establishment of the floating ex-
change rates which emerged from the so-called crisis
of 1971, the dollar was no longer overvalued relative
to other currencies and, as a result, U.S. exports of
goods and services rose.
While it is argued by some that flexible exchange
rates increase the risks of international trade, others
point out that the market pricing of currencies leads
to a reduction in trade restrictions. Governments
often attempt to maintain their currency values by
limiting imports and thereby limiting the amount of
domestic currency floxving into international exchange
markets, Such restrictions reduce the volume of trade
5Charles P. Kindelberger, Foreign Trade and the National
Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 142.
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and the consumption and investment opportunities of
the people. Nevertheless, the tendency to restrict
trade for purposes of maintaining artificial exchange
rates is well entrenched in the political arena.” W7ith
the demise of fixed rates this reason for erecting trade
barriers no longer exists.
Negotiations by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) members toward further tariff
reductions have continued in recent years. In 1973 the
members adopted a new Multifiber Textile Agree-
ment which is expected to liberalize and expand
world textile trade. The Trade Act of 1974 further
expanded the President’s negotiating authority to re-
duce tariffs. Also the nation’s economy is probably
still adjusting to reduced tariff barriers negotiated
following the Kennedy round of tariff reductions in
the 1960s. On the other hand, an increasing amount
of the trade negotiations in recent years appears to
have been negative. The agreements contain numer-
ous safeguards and relief provisions for real or imag-
ined damage to specific industries or labor, and safe-
guards to national security. Such actions, taken to
reverse earlier free trade practices, tend to offset ac-
tions intended to further liberalize trade.
While the higher oil prices following the actions of
the OPEC cartel cut two ways in the export picture,
they probably contributed to increased U.S. farm ex-
ports on balance. U.S. oil purchases from abroad have
increased several fold since the cartel was formed,
and a larger quantity of farm commodities are re-
quired to purchase a given quantity of oil. On the
negative side, however, a number of the major im-
porters of U.S. farm commodities, such as Japan and
Germany, nosy use a larger portion of their foreign
exchange to purchase oil from the OPEC nations.
Apparently these nations will have less foreign ex-
change to purchase farm products from the United
States.
Free Trade — A Boon to Am-c-rican
Agriculture
The sharp increase in U.S. exports within the free
market setting of recent years reflects a further con-
centration of resources in those sectors of the nation’s
economy having the greatest relative advantage.
World trade rises as a result of further specialization
in resource use. Each trading nation specializes in the
production of those commodities in which it has a
relative advantage over the rest of the world. Nations
‘See Gerald NI . Meicr, Problem-s of Trade Policy Oxlord Uni-
versity Press, 1973), p. 16.
tend to make resource adjustments more nearly in
accord with production efficiencies and world mar-
kets. World resources move to those uses which will
provide maximum returns, Consequently, each nation
produces those products in which it has the greatest
relative advantage.
The United States has a relative advantage in the
production of agricultural commodities. This nation
has an abundance of fertile soil, generally favorable
weather, and relatively high technological develop-
ment in agriculture. Consequently, by specializing in
agricultural production and trading farm products for
the products of other nations, such as petroleum,
Inetals, tropical fruits, coffee, and other imports, we
have more goods available for consumption than
would be available without the specialization of pro-
duction and trading. Our increase in farm exports is
thus more than matched by a gain in our ability to
purchase goods and services produced by other na-
tions. Conversely, the gain in exports to the United
States by other nations increases their ability to pur-
chase our farm products and provides them ssith more
goods for consumption. Consequently, any restrictions
which dampen our imports or interfere with inter-
national trade in any way reduce the degree of
mutually profitable international specialization and
thereby restrict the export market for domestic farm
products.
External world trade and U.S. farm exports can be
expected to increase further as the major economies
of the world accept freer trade policies. For trade to
continue to expand, however, free trade policies are
necessary for both exports and imports. Restrictions on
imports of foreign goods and services, farm price
supports and production controls, and quotas on ex-
ports are not conducive to world trade growth. Na-
tions which follow such arbitrary- trade restricting
practices and production controls cause importing
nations to lose confidence in them as a source of
supply. Importers will thus become more self suffi-
cient or look elsewhere for a more reliable supply for
the same reason that the United States hopes to gain
greater self sufficiency in petroleum production and
usage. If the United States cams avoid such restrictions,
our farm exports should continue to expand. Farmers
will experience gains from tile expansion. Imports of
nonfarm products should increase and somewhat
slower growth will occur in the domestic production
of those types of products that are imported. How-
ever, greater expansion will occur in the farm sector
and in the farm supply industries such as fertilizer
and farm machinery. I-fence, the rise in specialization
Page 23and foreign trade will not cause any net loss of jobs
or reduce the overall returns to labor and other re-
sources. In contrast, all trading nations should gain
from the greater output and consumption resulting
from further world specialization of resource use and
production.
CONCLUSION
Since 197(1 U.S. farm exports have risen sharply,
both in dollar value and relative to total farm com-
modity sales. Farm exports now accounf for almost
25 percent of the value of all farm commodity sales,
about the same percent as in the early 1920s — a
period of relatively free trade.
During the four decades from 1933 to 1972, farm
exports averaged less than 12 percent of farm com-
modity sales. During most of this period, farm product
prices were maintained above free market levels
through Government production control and price
support programs. These programs limited the expan-
sion of farm exports by raising the costs of such com-
modities to foreign purchasers. At the higher prices,
foreign producers had greater incentive to increase
prodnetion of these and substitute products. In addi—
tion, the support prices contributed to the replace-
ment of cotton by synthetic fibers in both domestic
and foreign markets.
With the elimination of most price supports and
production controls on farm products in the early
I970s, farm exports relative to total sales again
climbed to about their 1920-30 levels. While a portion
of the recent farm export gains can be attributed to
reduced tariffs and other factors, such as the move to
more flexible exchange rates and a relatively peaceful
international scene, part of the gain is attributable to
the relaxed domestic price support and production
control programs.
If the restrictive farm programs are not reimposed,
and free trade practices are maintained, a high per-
centage of the nation’s farm production will probably
continue to be exported. This nation has a relative
advantage in the production of most farm products
and under a free trade regime farm exports will rise.
A rising volume of farm exports under free market
conditions is beneficial to American farmers and at
the same time increases the goods and services avail-
able to all people in the trading nations.